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ABSTRACT
Internet users and businesses are increasingly using online
social networks (OSN) to drive audience traffic and increase
their popularity. In order to boost social presence, OSN
users need to increase the visibility and reach of their online
profile, like - Facebook likes, Twitter followers, Instagram
comments and Yelp reviews. For example, an increase in
Twitter followers not only improves the audience reach of
the user but also boosts the perceived social reputation and
popularity. This has led to a scope for an underground mar-
ket that provides followers, likes, comments, etc. via a net-
work of fraudulent and compromised accounts and various
collusion techniques.
In this paper, we landscape the underground markets that
provide Twitter followers by studying their basic building
blocks - merchants, customers and phony followers. We
charecterize the services provided by merchants to under-
stand their operational structure and market hierarchy. Twit-
ter underground markets can operationalize using a pre-
mium monetary scheme or other incentivized freemium
schemes. We find out that freemium market has an oligopoly
structure with few merchants being the market leaders. We
also show that merchant popularity does not have any corre-
lation with the quality of service provided by the merchant
to its customers. Our findings also shed light on the char-
acteristics and quality of market customers and the phony
followers provided. We draw comparison between legitimate
users and phony followers, and find out key identifiers to
separate such users. With the help of these differentiating
features, we build a supervised learning model to predict
suspicious following behaviour with an accuracy of 89.2%.
1. INTRODUCTION
Social media presence has become vital for businesses for
lead generation, and users to increase their popularity
amongst their friends network. In order to enhance and
maintain social media presence, users need to generate a
following for their social profile, such as - likes on the Face-
book page, followers on Twitter and comments on Insta-
gram post. Recent studies have indicated the growth of
underground markets for the purchase of Twitter followers,
Facebook likes, Instagram followers and Yelp reviews [1, 4,
13, 14, 17, 18]. Users subscribe to services of underground
markets to artificially boost their social media presence and
influence.
An increase in Twitter followers not only improves the
audience reach of the user but also boosts her perceived so-
cial reputation and popularity. Rising demand of Twitter
followers has led to the growth of an underground industry
that caters to users’ need for quick followers. We refer to
this underground industry as follower market and to their
operators as follower merchants. As per a 2014 study, sell-
ing fake Twitter followers generates a revenue up to an es-
timated $360 million per year [2]. Service provided by the
merchants is not restricted to monetary payment by the cus-
tomers. There exist two major types of operational schemes
in Twitter underground markets - premium and freemium.
In premium markets, the customer has to pay to the mer-
chant in order to gain followers. Freemium markets operate
by making the customer authorize merchant’s Twitter ap-
plication, hence including the customer in a phony follower
collusion network.
Underground market has constantly evolving techniques
to provide phony followers like (i) selling fraudulent accounts,
i.e., pseudonym accounts which act as fake followers; (ii)
using compromised accounts where the malware on user’s
machine or compromised credentials cause her to follow cus-
tomer’s account without user’s knowledge; (iii) leveraging
collusion networks where customers are incentivized to be-
come part of the follower network [14, 17]. To understand
the structure and characteristics of Twitter follower market,
we focus on its basic building blocks viz. (i) follower mer-
chants, (ii) customers, i.e. the user who take services from
these merchants, and (iii) phony followers, i.e., the followers
provided as a service to a customer by the merchant. An ar-
tificially inflated follower count can give the user a veneer of
importance and popularity in Twittersphere. In an attempt
to disrupt the operations of the Twitter follower market, re-
searchers have proposed techniques to detect customers in
paid markets by characterizing their behavioral patterns in
contrast to legitimate users [13, 14]. In this study, we do not
limit ourselves to only paid markets but also characterize
customers of freemium markets. Previous studies have also
investigated the impact of fraudulent accounts created by
the merchants which are used as phony followers, and have
developed supervised learning model to detect such Twitter
accounts [17]. However, we broaden our study to encompass
not only fraudulent accounts, but also the followers who are
legitimate users part of the collusion follower network.
This study landscapes the Twitter follower market. Char-
acterization and analysis of 60 freemium and 57 premium
markets shed light on (i) structure of the follower merchants,
(ii) quality of customers and (iii) key identifiers to distin-
guish between phony follower accounts and legitimate users.
In particular, we present following contributions:
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First, we conduct a longitudinal study to characterize
Twitter follower merchants. In order to identify the most
popular merchants and market leaders, we introduce the
idea of Quality of Service (QoS) for the Twitter follower
markets. QoS is an important parameter to judge the over-
all performance of a service, in our case, the follower mer-
chants [6]. As discussed in Section 3.2, we define a metric
for QoS, which takes into account the services promised by
the merchant, expectation by the customer and difference
between the two. Using the QoS and popularity metric, we
are able to highlight a hierarchy of follower merchants in the
underground market and show that this market exhibits an
oligopoly structure.
Second, we assess the customers taking services from the
follower market. We characterize customers of various mer-
chants on the basis of their social reputation and profile
attributes. We observe that customers lying on the higher
strata of quality take services of freemium merchants.
Lastly, We present an anatomy of the purchased Twitter
followers. We characterize profile attributes and behavioural
features of purchased followers. We identify key indicators
to distinguish between suspicious following behaviour from
that of legitimate Twitter users. We use these identifiers
and build a supervised learning mechanism which detects
suspicious following behaviour with an accuracy of 89.2%.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present some closely related work fo-
cussed on underground markets on Web 2.0. In particular,
we summarize previous literature on analysis and detection
of social media underground markets.
Social Media Underground Market.
Researchers have shown that miscreants use several strate-
gies to monetize spam and other malicious activities [10].
There exists a large underground market which sells spe-
cialized services and products like fraudulent accounts [15,
17], solving CAPTCHA [11], pay-per-install [7], and writing
fake reviews or website content [12, 19]. Social media users
take such services to increase their online presence. For ex-
ample, on Twitter, users attempt to gain followers in order
to boost their popularity [8]. Underground markets are a
threat to the quality of service and are generating a revenue
of about $360 million per year from sale of fake Twitter fol-
lowers [2]. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study
of Twitter follower market to understand how it operates
and assess the Quality of Service [6] and percieved gain by
the use of phony follower merchants.
Fraudulent Account Detection.
Recent studies have shown that merchants often create
fake accounts to deliver services like phone verified email
accounts [16], Twitter followers [17] and Facebook Likes [5].
Researchers show that such fraudulent accounts can be de-
tected at the time of account creation by merchants by find-
ing patterns in account naming convention and registration
process [17]. In this paper, we focus on phony followers of
the customers. However, we do not limit our study to only
fraudulently created accounts; we charecterize and detect
fake as well as legitimate accounts that exhibit suspicious
following behaviour.
Merchant and Customer Detection.
Social media users are increasingly taking underground
market services to increase their following. Researchers have
modelled suspicious Twitter following behaviour by identi-
fying difference in follow pattern from the majority [9]. Pre-
vious studies highlight the unfollow dynamics of the victim
customer accounts whose credentials are compromised by
merchants [14]. In this paper, we study not only compro-
mised users but also the legitimate users part of the collusion
follower network.
3. BACKGROUND
The goal of our study is to characterize the underground
follower market. Before we elaborate our dataset and method-
ology, in this section, we briefly describe the popular market
schemes. We also discuss the QoS metric to quantify the
quality and uncover the underlying hierarchy of merchants.
3.1 Freemium and Premium Markets
The underground follower market operates by either sell-
ing followers or incentivizing the customers to become part
of the phony follower network in order to increase follower
count. Here, we present in brief how freemium and premium
market schemes operate.
Premium Market.
Under the premium scheme, customers have to pay money
to the merchants in order to gain followers. Customer pro-
vides a Twitter username to the merchants for which she
wants to increase the follower count, and buys a specific
package (e.g. package - 1000 followers for $3). Within a span
of few minutes to few hours, depending upon the merchant,
follower count of the specific Twitter username (provided
to the merchant) increases as per the package. Premium
market allows a customer to buy bulk followers for not just
himself but any Twitter user. This has opened up new pos-
sibilities of exploitation by spammers. In 2014, a group of
hoaxters known for their notoriety, flooded a prominent on-
line daily’s Twitter account with fake followers to damage
the brand [3]. In this study, we analyse the structure and
characteristics of 57 such merchant websites which sell bulk
followers. The merchants under the premium scheme, either
simply sell followers in exchange of money, or also require
the customer to provide her Twitter account’s password so
that the customer can be made part of the collusion phony
follower network. Note that in both the cases, merchants
require monetary payment from the customer.
Freemium Market.
Freemium market scheme lets the customer gain follow-
ers without any monetary payment. However, in return,
the customer needs to authorize merchant’s Twitter appli-
cation that enables the merchant to include customer in the
collusion phony follower network. Most of the freemium
merchants display their recent customers on their website
and keep refreshing the list after every few minutes. Once
the customer authorize merchant’s app, she starts gaining
followers within minutes. The merchant app includes vari-
ous permissions like - see who you follow, follow new people,
update your profile, and post tweets for you. These per-
missions enable the merchant to make the customer follow
other Twitter users (which may be other customers of the
merchant) and also post promotional tweets on her behalf.
Since the customer does not have to provide her password
unlike the second scheme in premium markets as discussed
above, the customer is at a much lower risk of being com-
promised.
Figure 1 summarizes how the two market schemes oper-
ate. It can be seen that freemium market operate primarily
by leveraging collusion networks. This causes even legit-
imate users to exhibit phony follow behavior in return of
bulk followers. Customers who provide their passwords to
merchants under the premium scheme are at a high risk of
being compromised. Once compromised, these accounts can
be fully controlled by the merchants and used for following
other customers, spamming or sending promotional tweets
as and when required.
Figure 1: Different market schemes of follower market.
Merchants can enforce monetary payment or use Twitter ap-
plication to incentivize the customer. In both schemes, mer-
chant can leverage collusion networks to include customers
into the phony follower network.
3.2 Quality of Service
Twitter follower merchants lay down various terms of ser-
vices to the customers who subscribe to them. As of now,
we do not understand to what extent these merchants vio-
late their terms of services, who are the market leaders and
which merchants have maximum penetration in the market.
To answer all these questions, we use existing literure on
consumer research by Bolten et al. which provides a con-
ceptual framework to model customer’s assessment of service
quality and value [6]. We apply the formulization of Quality
of Service (QoS) to the underground follower merchants to
understand the quality and hierarchy of merchants.
Researchers have shown that the measure of QoS can be
based on performance of the service, expectation by the cus-
tomer and the gap between these two parameters. Based on
this, QoS can be defined as a function q –
QoS = q(PERFORM,EXPECT,DISCONFIRM) (1)
where PERFORM is a vector of the performance of a mer-
chant based on several terms of services {SA1...SAk}, i.e.,
PERFORM = pk(SAk) (2)
EXPECT is a vector which describes the prior expectations
of the customer for each term of service ∈ {SA1...SAk}.
DISCONFIRM is a vector describing the amount of discrep-
ancy between performance of the merchant and expectation
of the customer for each of the terms of services.
This definition of QoS helps us to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the underground merchants and understand the
structure of Twitter follower market. In Section 5.1.2, we
describe in detail how we use this QoS formulization to as-
sess the performance of merchants.
4. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our dataset and explain the
methodology we use for the analysis of underground market.
4.1 Data Collection Methodology
We collect data from both premium as well as freemium
merchants. Since we want to landscape the merchants, cus-
tomers and followers, we undergo a three step process to
collect data from freemium and premium merchants.
Merchant Identification.
One of the building blocks of underground follower mar-
ket is the merchants, i.e., the operators who provide phony
followers to customers. In order to identify the merchant
websites, we use search engine queries and filter results of
Twitter search. Table 1 shows the list of keywords which
we use to identify merchant websites from premium and
freemium market. We limit our search space to web engine
(Google and Bing) results, tweets and Twitter user profile
descriptions which match the keywords or a combination of
keywords in the category.
Table 1: shows keywords which are used to identify mer-
chants. Search engine results are directly used after manual
filtering. Twitter search results reveal promotional tweets as
well as user profiles which reveal more merchant websites.
Keywords
Premium Freemium
Web Search buy, Twitter, followers,
bulk, increase, order,
grow, gain, more, real,
cheap
latest, riders, free,
followers, Twitter, ‘get
more’
Twitter
Search
recommend to gain, gain followers, gamer follow
train, wana gain followers, need more followers,
cheap followers
We manually clean the web search results to identify mer-
chant websites and group them into two categories - ‘freemium’
and ‘premium’. In case of Twitter search, there was lit-
tle difference between the promotional tweets and profile
descriptions of freemium and premium merchants. There-
fore, we use the same set of keywords to identify them and
manually group them once we obtain the merchant website
URLs. Some merchants offer both freemium and premium
schemes, therefore, they are grouped into both the cate-
gories. Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of websites we
obtain by Twitter search and web engine queries. Freemium
merchants have a larger tweet presence than premium mer-
chants. We posit that this is because freemium merchants
primarily operate using collusion network and sending pro-
motional tweets. Twitter search also reveals that few mer-
chants maintain a Twitter profile to gain audience. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows the distribution of merchants in both cate-
gories and indicates the merchants who maintain a Twitter
profile in our dataset. We identify 69 freemium merchants
and 107 premium merchants. Some of these merchants pro-
vide both freemium and premium schemes as indicated in
the figure. 50 merchants provided both schemes but did not
have a Twitter profile. Out of the 69 freemium merchants
(a) Merchants located by Twit-
ter search and web engine search
in each category.
(b) Pr=premium, Fr=freemium
and Tw=merchants which have a
Twitter profile.
Figure 2: Distribution of premium and freemium merchants
in our dataset. We use Twitter search and web search queries
to locate a merchant. We find that some merchants have a
Twitter profile and offer both premium and freemium ser-
vices.
we identify, only 60 merchant websites publically display the
latest customers on their websites. Also, we buy followers
from 57 of the premium merchants in our dataset. Next, we
describe in detail how we obtain the dataset of phony follow-
ers. Though we were able to identify over 100 merchants, we
use the aforementioned dataset because (i) some of the mer-
chant websites did not let us scrape them to collect their
customer Twitter handles, (ii) some of the payment gate-
ways did not seem to be safe and hence we did not make a
purchase due to security reasons.
Phony Follower Data Collection.
To identify large number of phony followers, we subscribed
to services of premium and freemium merchants. For this
task, we created dummy Twitter accounts to get followers
from freemium and premium merchants. Table 2 shows ser-
vices provided by the merchants from where we receive the
phony followers.
In case of freemium merchants, we used dummy accounts
to subscribe to each of the merchants; we used one dummy
account per merchant. We authorized the Twitter applica-
tion of each merchant website, in return of which we recieved
followers. The followers were added to our dummy accounts
at an average rate of 84 unique followers per hour as shown
in Table 3 and overall we received 82,808 followers. For pre-
mium merchants, we used one dummy account per merchant
to gain followers. We purchased the basic package from each
of the merchants and obtained 87,458 followers. Table 2
shows that in our dataset we have 5 merchants which offer
only premium services. Overall, we recieved 170,356 follow-
ers which wr consider have a suspicious following behaviour.
Out of these 5 merchants, 2 merchants did not require cus-
tomer password as part of any of their follower packages.
Therefore, we assume that the followers obtained from these
2 merchants are not part of any collusion network and are
hence either fraudulently created or compromised accounts.
We ensured that we subscribed to a merchant as soon
as we created the dummy Twitter account for that mer-
chant. Therefore, we assume that any follower gained by
the dummy account is part of the phony follower network
Table 2: Shows the types of services provided by the mer-
chants from where we recieved our dataset of phony followers.
Model #Merchants #Followers
Freemium
Only Freemium 12
82,808
Freemium + Premium 57
Premium
Only Premium 5
87,458
Freemium + Premium 52
provided by the subscribed merchant. As shown in Table 3,
we further observe that there is a lot of variation in number
of followers obtained in case of freemium market, though we
subscribed to similar services. Likewise, in case of premium
market, we ordered minimum 1,000 followers but received
as low as 738 followers. This indicates clear difference in
operations of various merchants, which we further discuss in
Section 5.1.1.
Table 3: Shows the number of phony followers collected
from each kind of market. The last column shows the distri-
bution of each parameter for all the merchants of specified
category.
Mean Median Min Max Distribution
Fr
Followers/Hr 84 85 60 105
Followers 1,505 1,524 678 2,030
Pr
Cost/1000
Followers
$8.4 $8 $3 $14
Followers 1,590 1,607 738 2,095
Market Customer Ground Truth Data.
Customer users of premium merchants are not disclosed
by the merchant websites. However, in case of freemium
merchants, the latest customers are often displayed on the
website with a link to their Twitter profile, and the list is
refreshed after every few minutes. In order to collect the
ground truth data of customers, we scrape 60 such freemium
merchant websites which provide link to their latest cus-
tomers and obtain 171k unique customer profiles by taking
hourly snapshots. Table 4 describes the customer dataset in
more detail.
Table 4: Dataset description of customers located in
freemium market over a period of 4 months by scraping 60
merchant websites.
Data Collection Timeframe 2014-07-18 - 2014-11-18
Number of Snapshots 2,870
Number of Merchants 60
Number of Customers Located 171,234
Verified Customers 10
Customers of premium merchants are not disclosed. Hence,
we limit our study to the customers of freemium market and
study their behaviour.
4.2 Ethical Consideration
We ensured that all money we paid to underground mer-
chants to acquire fake followers was exclusively for the dummy
Twitter accounts we created. The dummy accounts were
fully controlled by us and were for the sole purpose of con-
ducting experiments in this paper. We revoked the mer-
chant’s application after the experiments were conducted to
ensure that we do not cater to the collusion follower network.
5. LANDSCAPING TWITTER FOLLOWER
UNDERGROUND MARKET
In this section, we study in detail the characteristics of
the merchants, customers and followers provided by the mer-
chants in deatil, to understand the structure of underground
follower market.
5.1 Twitter Follower Merchants
Merchants are the market operators which provide phony
followers to their customers. We recall that merchants can
offer premium, freemium or both the schemes to their cus-
tomers.
5.1.1 Merchants violate their promises
The merchants of underground Twitter follower market
offer various guaranteed services to customer at the time
of subscription. Many merchants promise services like au-
thentic followers, moneyback guarantees, quick followers and
follower retention which encourage the customers to either
buy bulk followers from premium merchants or subscribe to
freemium merchants. Table 5 shows the list of most common
promises made by the merchants. Though these promises
and guarantees seem lucrative, and hence attract a lot of
customers, merchants often violate these services.
Lack of follower retention.
Most of the preemium merchants provide follower reten-
tion policy, i.e., they state that - “if you loose any number of
followers...we’ll refill the page with the lagging followers, at
absolutely free of cost”. Therefore, we expect that customers
will always have the same number of followers at any point
of time which they initially purchased. To assess whether
this is true or not, we continuously monitor the followers
gained by our dummy customer accounts for the premium
market. We observed that only 3 merchants provided us
lesser followers than promised and rest 54 merchants pro-
vided us either the exact number of requested followers or
more (as previously seen in Table 3). However, after the
date of purchase and the gain of requested amount of fol-
lowers, we observed constant drop in the follower count in
case of all the customers. We further investigated the drop
in follower count by taking hourly snapshots of each of the
customer profile and observed constant fluctuations in the
follower count during each day. Figure 3 shows this phe-
nomena for one of the popular premium merchants in our
dataset.
To analyse whether the dips in follower count are at a
specific time, we measured correlation of follower count with
hour of the day. We calculated the Pearson Correlation Co-
efficient (PCC) between the follower count distribution and
the corresponding hour of the day of snapshot time. We
found that there does not exist any correlation between the
follower count and time for any of the merchants (max PCC
= 0.02, indicating negligible correlation). We also observed
that there were several dips in the follower counts in both
markets, however, we did not gain new users as followers.
Users from the same set of initially obtained users kept un-
following and following us back. We posit that the reason
behind such following behaviour is that since the follower
Figure 3: Shows the dips in follower count every hour
for one of the most prominent premium merchants in our
dataset. Few minutes/hours after the dips, the follower count
rises back.
accounts’ activities are controlled by the merchants, they
optimize who to follow to cater to a larger customer base
without raising suspicion of following too many users at a
given point of time.
Table 5: List of most popular promises and guarantees made
by the merchant to customers.
Promises by Merchants to Customers
Freemium
60+ new followers per ride
promotional status updates
never alter profile information
Premium
new followers every minute
Ad free – No promotional tweets
3 month no drop guarantee – follower retention policy
genuine profile – legitimate users will follow
delivered in 1-2 days
5.1.2 Quality evaluation of merchants
Catering to the needs of customer is the key to successful
busineses. Twitter follower merchants make several promises
to attract and retain customers, as previously indicated in
previous section. Therefore, we calculate Quality of Service
of the merchants to understand how well they are catering
to their customers. We use the following definition of QoS
and its parameters as described earlier in Equation (1)
QoS = q(PERFORM,EXPECT,DISCONFIRM)
For simplicity, we give equal weightage to all the promises,
and hence pk = 1 in Equation (2). DISCONFIRM is the
discrepency between performance of merchant and expeca-
tion of the customer for a particular promise made by the
merchant. For a specific merchant, we calculate the collec-
tive QoS based on all the promises {SA1...SAN} which it
provides as -
QoS =
∑N
i=1
[
1−
(
EXPECTi−PERFORMi
PERFORMi
)]
N
Note that in case a merchant overdelivers a certain promise,
then the above formulization of QoS for that specific promise
gets a value > 1, hence rewarding the merchant. This gives
us a normalized value of QoS for all the merchants. Figure 4
shows the QoS curve for both freemium and premium mer-
chants. The knee point of the QoS curve for freemium mar-
ket lies at X=0.1, Y=0.3; this indicates that 90% freemium
merchants have a QoS value of 0.3 or less. The knee point
for premium merchants is at X=0.05, Y=0.28 indicating that
95% premium merchants in our dataset have a normalized
QoS value of 0.28 or lesser. The highest QoS for freemium
market is 0.82, whereas for premium we found it to be 0.78.
This shows that overall, QoS for freemium market is higher
than that of freemium market. We further investigate and
find that the violation of no drop guarantee is prime reason
behind the low QoS for premium market. We had earlier
seen this phenomena of follower drop in Figure 3. Frequent
drops in follower can raise a red flag against the customer,
and hence the merchants which deliver followers exhibiting
such phenomena are penalized in our formulization of QoS.
Figure 4: Quality of Service of Freemium and Premium
Markets.
5.1.3 Few merchants are market leaders
Now we evaluate which merchants attract the highest share
of user base. In order to do so, we compute the popularity
of each merchant by using two metrics - Alexa ranking of
merchant website, and number of promotional tweets. 1
Alexa Ranking.
Alexa rank measures website’s popularity based on the
traffic to that website. For each merchant, we extract the
global rank of its website and then compute the normalized
Alexa rank for merchant Mi as followed –
Alexa Normi = 1− AlexaRanki
max
i∈{1...N}
(AlexaRanki)
where N is the total number of merchants. This gives us a
normalized measure of website traffic between 0 and 1.
Social Media Popularity.
We also use social media popularity of the merchant web-
site by collecting the promotional tweets advertising the
merchant if any. We search for each merchant’s URL and its
Bitly shortened version using Twitter search API. We then
define the OSN popularity for each of the N merchants as –
OSN Popularityi =
NumTweeti
max
i∈{1...N}
(NumTweeti)
where NumTweeti is the number of promotional tweet for
merchant Mi. Using these two metrics, we finally draw the
overall popularity of a merchant website by taking an aver-
age of normalized Alexa ranking and OSN Popularity.
Merchant Popularityi =
Alexa Normi + OSN Popularityi
2
Figure 5 shows the distribution of popularity of all the mer-
chant websites. We notice that 5 of the merchants have
very high popularity as compared to other merchant web-
sites. The top 5 merchants have a normalized popularity
score of more than 0.71 (71%). This indicates that there
1Alexa – http://www.alexa.com/
Figure 5: Quality of Service of Freemium and Premium
Markets.
exists an oligopoly hierarchical structure amongst the mer-
chants. 2 That is, there are few market leaders which attract
most of the audience. We notice that 4 of the market lead-
ers have Twitter verified customers in our dataset. 3 The
data collection from freemium merchant websites show that
atleast 10 Twitter verified accounts subscribed to services of
one of the top 4 merchants represented in Figure 5. This also
indicates that market leaders attract high profile customers.
5.1.4 Merchant popularity does not reflect quality
Next we try to answer whether the merchant popularity
is reflective of its Quality of Service or not. We find that
there does not exist any correlation between the QoS and
popularity distribution of the merchants. Figure 6 shows
the distribution of QoS against popularity for the follower
merchants. We observe that the most popular merchant
has a QoS value of only 0.40. Whereas, the highest quality
merchant has a popularity score of 0.42. In order to answer
why some merchants with high QoS have low popularity we
look at the pricing details and follower-gain/hour of those
merchants. We find that for most of such merchants, either
the cost of followers is high (in case of premium market)
or the follower gain per hour is low (for freemium market).
Hence, we postulate that higher cost and lower follower gain
must be the reason behind low popularity of these promise
delivering, high quality merchants.
Figure 6: Quality of Service vs Popularity of Merchants.
5.2 Underground Market Customers
2Oligopoly: http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/
Business_economics/Oligopoly.html
3Twitter vefiried users https://support.twitter.com/
articles/119135-faqs-about-verified-accounts
Now we study the characteristics of customers who sub-
scribe to follower merchants, to understand who these users
are and which services they subscribe to. Customers of pre-
mium market are undisclosed, hence, we limit our study to
merchants which provide either freemium service, or both
freemium and premium service.
5.2.1 Spammers, wannabes and celebrities
To understand who are the customers of follower mar-
ket, we use our dataset of 171,234 customers collected by
scraping the merchant websites. We find out whether they
are listed, verified and analyse their bio. Figure 7 shows
that many customers use ‘follow’, ‘artist’, ‘director’, ‘music’
in their bio. This indicates that these users are probably
wannabe artists and are trying to attract a large following.
We also analyzed the URLs posted by these users in their
latest 200 tweets and found that 10% of the users had posted
atleast one or more URL blacklisted by Google Safebrows-
ing 4 or Phishtank. 5 We also noticed that 10 of the cus-
tomers we acquired in our dataset were Twitter verified users
and had posted atleast one promotional tweet (which was
soon deleted) about the merchant website. This shows that
Twitter verified accounts, i.e., celebrity accounts, also use
freemium merchants to boost their follower count.
Figure 7: Wordcloud of bio of the customer profiles.
5.2.2 Market leaders attract prominent customers
To identify the prominent customers, we use ‘Klout’ 6
score. ‘Klout’ is a popular tool to measure influence based on
various factors like followers, freinds, retweets and favourites.
The average Klout score for the social media users is 40. 7
We found that 30% customers had a Klout score of more
than 40. Out of these prominent users, 81.7% users sub-
scribed to atleast one merchant with a Popularity Score >
0.72. This indicates that the merchants which are more pop-
ular and market leaders attract prominent customers who
have a higher reputation. We argue that the vice-versa is not
true because we observe that overall 54.3% customers who
had a less than average Klout score subscribed to atleast one
of the market leaders. This shows that its not the merchants
which are boosting the Klout score of their customers; high
reputation users are subscribing to market leaders.
5.3 Phony Followers of Underground Market
In this section, we present an anatomy of the phony follow-
ers which we recieve from various merchants. We find key
4Google Safebrowsing https://developers.google.com/
safe-browsing/
5Phishtank www.phishtank.com
6http://www.klout.com
7http://support.klout.com/customer/portal/
articles/679109-what-is-the-average-klout-score
identifiers which can be helpful to distinhuish from legiti-
mate users and hence help us to build an effective detection
model.
5.3.1 Phony followers have low social engagement
We explore how the purchased follower accounts are con-
nected with their friends. We measure social engagement of
users with their friends in form of retweets, @-mentions and
favorite count. We also find out language overlap patterns
between the users and her friends.
RTs and @-mentions.
We observed that a large fraction of purchased accounts
post only retweets instead of original content. We further ex-
plore whether these users retweet the content of their friends
or not. If RTcounti is the number of tweets the user has
retweeted of her friend ui and she has N friends, then
RetweetRatio =
RTcounti
ΣNi=1RTcounti
N ∗RTtotal
RTtotal is the total number of retweets done by the user.
This Retweet Ratio quantifies the number of friends a user
has retweeted and the number of times she retweeted them.
Figure 8: Social engagement of Purchased Users with their
Friends.
Similarly we define the @-mention ratio to determine whether
the user engages in conversations with her friends and to
what extent.
@mentionRatio =
@counti
ΣNi=1@counti
N ∗@total
where @total is the total number of @-mentions by the user.
We observe in Figure 8 that the highest Retweet Ratio score
is 0.45 and the @-mention ratio is 0.35. This shows that
though a large fraction of purchased accounts post only
retweets, its not the tweets of their friends which they are
retweeting. Similarly, low @-mention ratio suggests that
purchased followers do not mention their friends. We found
the maximum @-mention ratio with the followers of pur-
chased users to be 0.32. This indicates that purchased fol-
lowers are low quality users and do not engage in conversa-
tions with their friends or followers.
Language overlap with Friends and Followers.
We characterize the language used by the purchased fol-
lowers and the overlap with their friends. Figure 9 shows the
distribution of language of purchased accounts. We observe
that a 52% of the users tweet in spanish. We also found
that the purchased followers tweet and retweet in multiple
languages as shown in Figure 9. Thirteen percent users used
5 or more languages. Only 32% users posted tweets in less
than or equal to two languages. We next find out the over-
lap of language amongst the purchased accounts with their
followers and friends. Users tweet and retweet in multiple
(a) Distribution (b) Number of Languages
Figure 9: Languages used by Purchased Followers.
languages. We calculate the Language Overlap Score for
each user defined as
LangOverlap =
ΣNi=0overlapi
N
where N is the total number of friends or followers. If Lf is
the set of languages used by the friend/followers and Lu
is the set of languages used by the purchased user then
overlapi with each friend/follower ui is defined as
overlapi =
{
1, if |Lf ∩ Lu| 6= 0.
0, otherwise.
We use the Language Overlap score to determine how many
users tweet in same language as their friends or followers.
Figure 10 shows that 80% users had an Overlap Score =
0.37 with their followers and Overlap Score = 0.68 with their
friends. This indicates that a large fraction of purchased
follower accounts do not care about the content posted by
the users they are following. Also, the followers of these
users do not have a high language overlap with them.
Figure 10: Language Overlap of Purchased Followers with
their Friends and Followers.
5.3.2 Phony followers have low social reputation
Follower-Followee Ratio.
We now look at the relationship between amount of follow-
ers and friends for purchased follower accounts. On Twitter,
‘followers’ of a person are the users which subscribe to the
posts of that person, i.e., who ‘follow’ her. The ‘friends’ of
a person are the users whom she subscribes to. The aver-
age number of followers per existing account is 68 and the
average number of friends is 60 on Twitter.
Figure 11 shows that the follower/friends ratio fits the
power law (α = 1.8209, error σ = 0.029). We observe that
94% purchased followers have the follower/friends ratio as
only 0.1 and none of the purchased followers had more fol-
lowers than friends. Low follower/friends ratio indicates that
the user does not have a good following, therefore indicating
a low social importance.
Figure 11: Follower-Followee ratio of purchased follower
accounts.
Klout Score.
To measure the social influence, we use Klout score. We
recall that the average Klout score for the social media users
is 40. However, as shown in Figure 12, we found that 90%
of the purchased followers had a Klout score of less than 20.
This shows that these accounts do not involve in discussions
with other users and have a low influence score.
Figure 12: CDF of Klout Score of Purchased Fol-
lowers.
5.3.3 Phony followers exhibit high unfollow entropy
We found that the purchased follower unfollowed a large
number of users regularly. To quantify this behaviour, we
calculated the unfollow entropy of all the purchased follow-
ers. We observed each purchased follower over a span of 15
days and collected her hourly followers. We define normal-
ized unfollower entropy H for a user un as the following
Hun = −
ΣTi=1pn(fi)log(pn(fi))
N
where, pn(fi) is the probability that the user un will unfollow
at time ti. The probability function is defined as
pn(fi) =
ucounti
ΣTi=1ucounti
where T is the number of days for which we monitor the
purchased follower and ucounti is the number of users she
unfollowed on ith day. A higher value of unfollow entropy
signifies that the user exhibits a suspicious unfollow pattern.
Figure 13 shows that a large fraction of purchased follow-
ers have a high unfollow entropy. The normalized entropy
rate for 23% purchased followers is as high as 0.76 and only
8% users have a normalized unfollow entropy less than 0.21.
To find out whether the users with higher unfollow entropy
have lower quality than other users, we compared their nor-
malized unfollow entropy rate with Klout score. We found a
strong negative correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient
= -0.73 ) indicating that users with higher unfollow entropy
rate have low social reputation.
Figure 13: Unfollow Entropy Rate for Purchased Followers.
A large number of followers in our data follow-unfollow their
friends multiple times.
6. PREDICTION OF SUSPICIOUS FOLLOW-
ING BEHAVIOUR
In the second part of our study, we build a supervised
predictive model to detect suspicious following behaviour
on Twitter. In this section, we explain the feature set used
for the classification task and the experimental setup.
6.1 Features for Classification
For our prediction task to detect suspicious following be-
haviour, we explore user profile, network, content and user
behaviour based features. In all, we explore 18 features for
our classification task as described in Table 6. User pro-
file based features focus upon properties of the Twitter user
profile information. The network based features describe
the relationship of the user with her friends and followers.
We next explore the content based features to understand
the nature of tweets posted by the user and also investigate
the behavioural features to understand the tweeting patterns
and follow dynamics exhibited by the user. For the network
based features, we constrain our analysis to single hop net-
work of the users due to Twitter API rate limit restrictions.
Also, we keep our content based analysis limited to stylistic
features of tweets due to the presence of multilingual users
in our dataset and the complexity of computation due to
transliterated text, misspellings and use of short hand lan-
guage. Table 6 enlists all the feature sets we used for our
prediction task.
Table 6: Description of the feature sets used for prediction
of users with suspicious following behaviour.
Set Category Features
A User Profile
presence of bio
presence of URL in bio
number of posts
social reputation
B Network
follower / friends ratio
number of followers
C Content
hashtags per tweets
spam words used per tweet
length of tweet
number of languages used
number of RTs per tweet
@mentions per tweet
D Behaviour
unfollow entropy rate
RT engagement score
@mention engagement score
language overlap
time since last tweet
tweets per day
We explained some of these features in the previous sec-
tion; here we describe how we calculated the values of re-
maining features:
Presence of bio and URL.
Some Twitter users give description about themselves on
their profile which is called bio. We check the presence of
bio for each user under inspection. We also check whether
the user has mentioned any external URL in her bio and use
this as a feature.
Social reputation.
We define social reputation by the Klout score which gives
an estimate of the impact score of the user on various online
social networks.
Hashtags per tweet.
We calculate the average number of hashtags used per
tweet. We define this metric as
hashtag/tweet =
ΣNtweet=0#hashtags
#tweets
Spam words used per tweet.
In the earlier section, we noticed that a fraction of pur-
chased follower accounts also spread spam and malicious
content. To detect spam in the tweet content, we use a
spam word lookup list 8 and define the following metric
spam words/tweet =
ΣNtweet=0#spam words
#tweets
Time since last tweet.
We found that purchased followers exhibiting suspicious
following behaviour have very less tweeting activity and are
often inactive. To measure time since the account has been
inactive, we find the difference in time in seconds since the
latest tweet with the time of our experiment.
These are the discriminative features we use to distinguish
between regular and suspicious following behaviour. With
8http://www.mailup.com/spam-words-to-avoid.htm
the help of these features, we detect users with suspicious
follow behaviour in the following section.
6.2 Experimental Setup and Classification
For our classification experiment, we consider the 170k
public purchased followers as our true positive dataset of sus-
picious follow behaviour. For the negative class (legitimate
follow behaviour), we pick random 170k users from Twit-
ter stream using the streaming API. However, a balanced
dataset as ours may create a sample bias. Therefore, to en-
sure valid results and eliminate the bias, we under-sample
our negative class. We draw 10 random but independent
subsets from the set of 170k legitimate users (-ve class) and
train 10 classifier models based on these 10 subsets along
with the 170k samples of the suspicious follow behaviour
users (+ve class). We then use 10 fold cross validation and
report the average results for our prediction task.
We treat the detection of suspicious follow behaviour as a
two class classification problem. In order to detect such be-
haviour, we use several supervised learning algorithms like
Naive Bayes, Gradient Decent, Random Forest etc. How-
ever, we achieved highest accuracy and overall best results
with Support Vector Machine (SVM). We use a non-linear
SVM with the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel for our
experiment. Table 7 gives the details of our experimental
setup - dataset description and the parameter values for the
SVM classification algorithm.
Table 7: Description of the experimental setup for predic-
tion fo suspicious following behaviour.
Dataset 342,000 users
Suspicious (+ve class) 170,000 users
Legitimate (-ve class) 170,000 users (10 times)
Classifier SVM
C 1,000
alpha 20.0
Classification Runs 10
Feature Sets {A}, {A, B}, {A, B, C}, {A, B, C, D}
Train-Test Split 70%-30%
Cross Validation 10-fold
In order to assess the effectiveness of features, we repeat
the classification experiment by incrementally adding each
feature set. For evaluation, we used 70-30 split of the train-
ing and the testing dataset. We use 10 fold cross validation
to report our results.
6.3 Classification Results and Evaluation
Table 8 shows the confusion matrix for our classification
task. The confusion matrix defines the percentage of false
negatives and false positives. We were able to accurately
classify 88.5% users with suspicious follow behaviour and
89.9% users with legitimate behaviour. This shows that we
are able to detect suspicious following behaviour to a good
extent. For the evaluation of our classification result, we
used the standard evaluation metrics – accuracy, F-measure
and Area under the Curve (AUC).
As discussed in the previous section, we incrementally
added feature sets to evaluate the effectiveness of all the
features. Figure 14 shows the performance of our classifier
on Accuracy, F1 score and AUC metrics when feature sets
are incrementally added. We see that each feature set has
a positive effect on the performance of the classifier across
all metrics. We also observed that adding behavioural based
Table 8: Confusion Matrix – Classification Results of dis-
tinguishing legitimate users from those exhibiting suspicious
following behaviour.
Predicted
Suspicious Legitimate
True
Suspicious 88.5 11.5
Legitimate 9.7 89.9
features suddenly increase the overall accuracy of our classi-
fication model. We received a maximum accuracy of 89.2%.
Figure 14: Classification accuracy to predict suspicious fol-
lowing behaviour on incremental feature addition.
6.4 Feature Importance
In this section, we look at the importance of features used
for suspicious follow behaviour detection. We found that
behavioural features are important to detect suspicious be-
haviour. Unfollow entropy rate plays an important role; it is
defined as the frequency with which the user is unfollowing
her friends over time. Some of the most informative fea-
tures we received after our classification task were unfollow
entropy, RT-engagement ratio, @mention-engagement ratio,
Language Overlap and Social Reputation. The other infor-
mative and discriminative features were the use of multiple
hashtags and spam words in the tweets. The user profile
based features were the least helpful in detection of suspi-
cious follow behaviour. One possible reason for this could
be that a large fraction of legitimate users do not add a bio
or engage in heavy conversations on Twitter.
7. DISCUSSION
Follower markets enable users to artificially boost their
percieved reputation and popularity. Social media usually
do not have any defined metrics to gauge the influence of its
users. Therefore, the number of connections and following
of a user is believed to be a true reflection of user’s influence
and popularity. Our technique can help the social media
operator to identify accounts exhibiting suspicious follow-
ing behavior by reducing their search space for synthetically
created accounts by merchants. Suspension or deletion of
such synthetic accounts can effectively disrupt the services
of underground market.
Our study can also be utilized by legitimate users who
want to maintain a social network profile with only trustwor-
thy connections. Phony followers controlled by merchants
often follow few random users to maintain their follower-
friends count and hence evade detection. However, legiti-
mate users who want to avoid and block such users from fol-
lowing them can use our technique to identify their own fol-
lowers with suspicious behavior with a high accuracy. Such
measures can be used against scams like [3] where hoax-
ters bought 75k fake followers for a legitimate user. In case
of such attacks, our mechanism can help the victim user
by identifying fake followers and removing them from user’s
connections.
Our study also sheds light on the source of this problem,
i.e., the follower merchants. Follower merchants are respon-
sible for the generation of 10-20% spam accounts that ex-
ist on Twitter [17]. Therefore, its important to understand
the dynamics of these merchants. We show that though
there exist multiple merchants, the follower market has an
oligopolist structure; there exist only few market leaders at-
tracting most of the customers. Mitigating the operations
of market leaders can potentially reduce the infiltration of
synthetic and compromised accounts into the social network.
The merchants may try to adapt their operations once
we are effectively able to detect accounts exhibiting suspi-
cious following behaviour. However, one of our key observa-
tions is that we can identify the market leaders. Currently,
there exists a good amount of difference between the mar-
ket share of leaders and other merchants. Hence, even if the
merchants evolve their techniques, the market leaders would
not be difficlt to distinguish. Bringing down these market
leaders can help the social media operators to a large ex-
tent. Secondly, we observe that accounts with suspicious
following behaviour have a high unfollow entropy rate and
keep unfollowing and following back their friends. Since the
merchants try to provide bulk followers in a short amount
of time, they would have to manage who-to-follow of their
synthetic and compromised accounts to effectively cater to
their customers. These phony followers provided by mer-
chants would either get detected because of our technique,
or the merchants would have to slow down their operations
by reducing the follow-unfollow activity of the accounts they
control. Slowing down merchant’s activities would indirectly
benefit the social media operator because the merchants will
not be able to cater to a larger customer base. However, this
argument holds if merchants can create only limited number
of synthetic profiles. In case merchants have a large number
of sythetic profiles with a good follower-friends ratio with
low unfollow entropy, then they will be able to evade detec-
tion by out technique. However, creation of a large number
of sythetic accounts will have a higher cost to the merchants
and can also be detected by already existing techniques.
8. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we present a landscape of Twitter under-
ground follower market. We focus of the building blocks
of follower market - merchants, customers, phony followers.
We use a dataset of 60 freemium and 57 premium merchants
for our study which are most responsive and active. We col-
lect 170k phony followers from these merchants. Also, we
took hourly snapshots of the merchant websites which can be
further improved to collect a larger dataset. Though there
exist millions of compromised and synthetic accounts con-
trolled by the follower merchants, our dataset covers a large
portion of underground market over a course of 4 months.
Therefore, we posit that our results would be scalable over
a much larger network of underground merchants.
To summarise, we present the following in this study (i)
We measure the quality of service and uncover the underly-
ing hierarchy of merchants. We discover an oligopoly struc-
ture of the merchants, (ii) We analyze the reputation and
profile attributes of the market customers to understand who
they are are which merchants they subscribe to, (iii) We
study suspicious following behaviour of the phony followers
and build a supervised learning model to distinguish them
from legitimate users. This is the first study to landscape
all aspects of an underground market to understand the un-
derlying structure and characteristics.
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